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The FISA Court and Article III
Stephen I. Vladeck
Although it has existed for nearly forty years, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has received newfound
attention (and criticism) after, and in light of the 2013 disclosures
of a series of controversial U.S. surveillance programs by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Among other things, the
Snowden disclosures precipitated suggestions from at least some
circles that the FISC had failed to serve as a meaningful check on
the Executive Branch, at least largely because it had too easily
accepted and signed off on the government’s debatable (if not
dubious) interpretations of the relevant statutory authorities.1
Contemporary critics of the role of the FISC have tended to
focus on (1) the one-sided nature of most—if not all—proceedings
before the court; (2) the unique (and perhaps troubling) role of the
Chief Justice of the United States in selecting all of the FISC’s
judges—along with those of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR)—without any outside input or oversight;
and (3) the unconvincing reasoning in at least some of the key
FISC opinions upholding the telephone metadata program.2 To
 Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. My
thanks to Margaret Hu for inviting me to participate in the symposium for which
this Essay was prepared.
1. For the most comprehensive summary and encapsulation of these
critiques to date, see generally ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNEN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT (2015) (analyzing
potential constitutional concerns raised by FISC).
2. See id. at 29–43 (discussing constitutional concerns raised by FISC); see
also, e.g., Orin Kerr, My (Mostly Critical) Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC
Opinion on Section 215, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 7:39 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fisc-opinion-section215/ (last visited June 16, 2015) (analyzing and critiquing the reasoning in a FISC
opinion sustaining the metadata program) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Steve Vladeck, Making FISC More Adversarial: A Brief Response to
Orin Kerr, LAWFARE (July 8, 2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
making-fisc-more-adversarial-brief-response-orin-kerr (last visited Aug. 4, 2015)
(responding to Orin Kerr’s critiques of the FISC process and advocating for the
use of private attorneys to serve as “special advocates”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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that end, most calls for reform of the underlying surveillance
programs disclosed by Snowden have come alongside calls for at
least some reform of the FISC itself, whether by changing how its
judges are appointed, providing for more regular adversarial
participation by an outside “special advocate,” or even reassigning
some of the FISC’s jurisdiction to “ordinary” Article III courts.3
Whatever their merits, many of these proposed reforms have
been met with an array of prudential and constitutional
objections—including concerns that changes to the composition
and structure of the FISC would implicate Articles II and III of the
United States Constitution.4 But perhaps most remarkably, these
objections have revealed just how little effort has been undertaken
to explain why the FISC is constitutionally permissible in the first
place.5 After all, the FISC is an Article III court that was designed
to exclusively hear ex parte, in camera applications from the
government,
notwithstanding
Article
III’s
interrelated
requirements of a case or controversy and of meaningful
“adverseness.”6 And although the FISCR expressly held in 2002
that the nature of such warrant applications before the FISC
satisfies Article III,7 its analysis was, charitably, incomplete.
This symposium Essay aims to fill that gap. In particular, my
goal is to unpack the relationship between the FISC and Article III
3. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate,” 2
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Special Advocate].
4. See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., REFORM OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE
44–46 (2014) (discussing potential constitutional problems raised by “housing the
advocate in the judicial branch”); see also Letter from Hon. John D. Bates,
Director, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary 5–7 (Aug. 5, 2014) (relating legal concerns).
5. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA
“Special Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://justsecurity.org
/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (last visited June 17, 2015) (arguing that
the addition of a special advocate would not be unconstitutional, assuming the
current proceedings are constitutional) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. See id. (discussing the Article III adverseness requirement and the FISA
court).
7. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (U.S. Foreign Intell.
Surveil. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (stating that the court did “not think there is
much left to an argument made by an opponent of FISA in 1978 that the statutory
responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent with Article III case and
controversy responsibilities”).
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in some detail—and to provide a more detailed framework within
which to assess which aspects of the FISC’s caseload do and do not
raise Article III concerns, and how contemporary reform proposals
might assuage the former.
To that end, after providing a brief historical overview of the
FISC, Part I turns to the original role of the FISC under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),8 which
exclusively encompassed applications for individualized
“warrants,” albeit under a different probable cause standard than
is typically utilized in criminal cases. As Part I documents,
whereas FISA as originally enacted raised a host of Article III
concerns, the statute was ultimately predicated on an analogy to
“ordinary” warrant applications—which have long been held to
satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement insofar as
they are ancillary to subsequent judicial proceedings.
Part II turns to the post-1978 practice under FISA, along with
the September 11-era changes to FISA, especially those embodied
within the USA PATRIOT Act of 20019 and the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008.10 As Part II notes, leaving aside the substantive merits
of these developments in the abstract, both undermined at least to
some degree the Article III justifications that carried the day when
FISA was enacted. After all, practice under “classic” FISA revealed
how unusual it was for FISA warrants to actually lead to
subsequent criminal or civil proceedings—and how difficult it was
for litigants to collaterally attack FISA warrants even in the rare
cases in which they did.
Far more fundamentally, the authorities Congress
subsequently provided in statutes such as the USA PATRIOT Act
and FISA Amendments Act categorically departed from the
warrant model insofar as they invested the FISC with the ability
and responsibility to approve government surveillance authorities
that are wholly untethered from a specific target, but rather
provide for either or both bulk and programmatic collection of
foreign intelligence surveillance. Whatever the FISC is doing when
8. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 (2012)).
9. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
10. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
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it approves a government request for a production order or a
directive, it is most certainly not approving anything that remotely
resembles a “warrant” to conduct surveillance of an identified
suspect. At a minimum, then, these authorities require
fundamentally different Article III justifications (that have so far
not been provided).
To be sure, Congress may well have anticipated these Article
III concerns by authorizing adversarial participation by the
recipients of production orders under the USA PATRIOT Act11 and
directives under the FISA Amendments Act.12 But as Part II
concludes, the fact that such adversarial process has seldom been
utilized opens the door to serious Article III objections—that may
well be ameliorated through more regular participation by a
“special advocate.”
I. “Classic” FISA and Article III
As has been explained in detail elsewhere, FISA
was a response to two interrelated developments: the Supreme
Court’s 1972 decision in the Keith case declining to articulate a
domestic intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment,13 and a series of intelligence abuses
documented by the Church Committee several years later. 14
Together with the creation of the congressional intelligence
committees and a series of other reforms, FISA was part of a
larger structural accommodation between the three branches of
government: The Executive Branch agreed to have many of its
foreign intelligence surveillance activities subjected to far
greater legal oversight and accountability, in exchange for
which Congress and the courts agreed to provide such oversight
and accountability in secret. To that end, the core of FISA as
originally enacted was the authority provided by Title I of the
Act, which empowered the government to obtain secret
warrants for electronic—and, later, physical—surveillance of
11. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (2012) (setting out procedures for judicial review
of production orders).
12. See id. § 1881a(h) (authorizing directives and providing for judicial
review thereof).
13. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320–21 (1972)
(rejecting the government’s arguments for a domestic surveillance exception).
14. S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976).
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individuals whom the government had probable cause to believe
were acting as an agent, or on behalf, of a foreign power.15

To supervise these new “FISA warrants,” Congress created a
specialized court—the FISC—to hear government applications ex
parte and in camera.16 The court would be staffed by seven (now
eleven) sitting Article III district judges selected to serve sevenyear terms by the Chief Justice of the United States, three of whom
“shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia.”17 Except
15. Special Advocate, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2). Applications in the
non-FISA context require probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a
crime. FISA, in contrast, requires probable cause to believe that the target of the
surveillance is, or is an agent of, a “foreign power.” The relaxed probable cause
standard in the FISA context has been challenged as not satisfying the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause. But that argument was rejected by numerous
courts prior to September 11 2001, at least largely because of the “primary
purpose” doctrine—which required the government to certify that the primary
purpose of a FISA warrant was foreign intelligence surveillance and not ordinary
law enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914
(4th Cir. 1980) (“[B]ecause of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its
practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not
require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign
intelligence surveillance.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572
(1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary
purpose of the surveillance.”).
But when Congress abolished the primary purpose doctrine in the USA
PATRIOT Act, the FISCR—in its first-ever published decision—nevertheless
upheld the probable cause standard against a Fourth Amendment challenge. See
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736–46 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. Rev.
2002) (per curiam) (holding that the relaxed “significant purpose” standard does
not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.
Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (D. Or. 2007) (holding that the lesser “significant purpose”
standard in the USA PATRIOT Act violates the Fourth Amendment), vacated on
other grounds, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2009).
16. Because the FISC is an inferior court created by Congress, staffed by
Article III judges, exercising jurisdiction over what are indisputably federal
questions, and subject to supervision within the Article III judicial system, it is
beyond peradventure that it is an “Article III court.” See, e.g., In re Motion for
Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil.
Ct. Rev. 2007) (“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is
an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III . . . .”). But see
Orin Kerr, More on Article III and Appellate Review in the Leahy Bill, LAWFARE
(Aug. 5, 2014, 3:20 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/more-on-article-iiiand-appellate-review-in-the-leahy-bill/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (“[I]t’s not
obvious to me that having a federal judge review a warrant application makes
that review an exercise of Article III power.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012).
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in emergencies (where, presumably, the locally resident judges
would be available), the judges otherwise rotate through the FISC,
such that each judge is on duty in Washington for one out of every
eleven weeks.
If the FISC denies the government’s application, Congress
authorized the government to either seek rehearing before the
entire FISC, sitting en banc, appeal to the newly created Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) staffed by three
sitting circuit judges designated by the Chief Justice, or both.18 If
unsuccessful there, FISA authorized the government to appeal to
the Supreme Court.19 As originally constituted, FISA thus
contemplated that the FISC would resolve individualized warrant
applications on a case-by-case basis, ex parte and in camera, and
with only the government authorized to participate—and, if
necessary, to appeal.20
Separate from the substantive foreign intelligence
surveillance authorities codified in FISA, Congress justified the
creation of a new, specialized court largely on grounds of
expediency: “Requiring the special court to sit continuously in the
District of Columbia will facilitate necessary security procedures
and, by ensuring that at least one judge is always available, will
ensure speedy access to it by the Attorney General when timeliness
is essential for intelligence purposes.”21 Moreover, a specialized
court would “likely . . . be able to put claims of national security in
a better perspective and to have greater confidence in interpreting

18. See id. § 1803(b) (establishing a court of review).
19. See id. (providing for appeal to the Supreme Court).
20. In the first case to reach the FISCR, the Court of Review received amicus
briefs from several parties. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 n.1, 737 (U.S.
Foreign Intell. Surveill. Ct. Rev. 2002) (“We are, therefore, grateful to the ACLU
and NACDL for their briefs that vigorously contest the government’s argument.”).
But after the FISCR ruled for the government, the Supreme Court denied the
ACLU’s motion to intervene for purposes of filing a petition for certiorari. See
ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920, 920 (2003) (denying the ACLU’s motion for
leave to intervene to file a petition for certiorari).
21. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 71 (1978); see also S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12
(1978) (“The need to preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and
methods justifies . . . consolidation of judicial authority in a special court.”),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980.
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this bill than judges who do not have occasion to deal with the
surveillances under this bill.”22
Congress’s confidence notwithstanding, at least some experts
feared that such a categorically ex parte structure for the FISC
would raise serious Article III concerns. Thus, then-Professor (and
future Judge) Laurence Silberman testified that “[a]lthough it is
true that judges have traditionally issued search warrants ex
parte, they have done so as part of a criminal investigative process
which . . . for the most part, leads to a trial, a traditional adversary
proceeding.”23 FISA surveillance, in contrast, was designed
principally (if not primarily) to facilitate foreign intelligence
investigations—and not criminal prosecutions. Indeed, that very
orientation away from ordinary law enforcement helped to allay
what otherwise might have been serious Fourth Amendment (and
prudential) objections to FISA’s lower probable cause standard.24
But Silberman’s objections were largely mooted by a
memorandum (and subsequent congressional testimony) prepared
by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).
Although OLC agreed that the Article III question was “difficult,”
it concluded that the structure FISA contemplated for the FISC
was probably constitutional, both because (1) “FISA Court
judges . . . would still be applying the law to the facts of a
particular case” and (2) “in normal criminal cases, the government
is permitted to persuade a court of the need for a warrant without
the target being present.”25 In other words, the constitutional
defense of the FISC turned on the limited scope of the review it
was providing and the analogy to “ordinary” warrant
applications—which, despite typically involving ex parte, in
camera proceedings, were understood to raise no Article III

22. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 91 (1978).
23. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R.
9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation. of the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 224 (1978) (statement of
Hon. Laurence Silberman) [hereinafter “FISA Hearings”].
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the probable cause
requirements in the FISA context).
25. FISA Hearings, supra note 23, at 26–31 (statement of John M. Harmon,
Asst. Att’y. Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
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questions insofar as they were ancillary to subsequent criminal (or
civil) proceedings.26
To further pretermit these constitutional objections, Congress
revised the draft of FISA to help strengthen the analogy to
“ordinary” warrants. FISA as thus enacted required that criminal
defendants be notified when “any information obtained or derived
from an electronic surveillance” was to be used in their
prosecutions.27 The statute also provided an express cause of
action for damages for an “aggrieved person” who was subjected to
unlawful surveillance under FISA.28 And although FISA warrants
were not typically meant to produce evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions, the fact that they could be collaterally attacked in at
least some cases provided both a vehicle for raising Article III
objections and the rejoinder courts would supply in rejecting them.
Thus, in United States v. Megahey,29 a district court rejected a
criminal defendant’s attempt to suppress FISA-derived evidence
on the ground that the proceedings before the FISC violated Article
III.30 As Judge Sifton explained,
Applications for electronic surveillance submitted to FISC
pursuant to FISA involve concrete questions respecting the
application of the Act and are in a form such that a judge is
capable of acting on them, much as he might otherwise act on
an ex parte application for a warrant. In the case of each
application, the FISC judge is statutorily obliged to ensure that
26. In a recent article, James Pfander and Daniel Birk have identified FISA
warrant proceedings as emblematic of a larger species of “non-contentious
jurisdiction”—cases in which it has long been understood that Article III’s typical
requirement of “adverseness” simply does not apply, whether or not the judicial
review is ancillary to subsequent proceedings. James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk,
Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious
Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1462–65 (2015). As explained below, however,
whatever the Article III justification for “classic” FISA warrants, neither the
OLC’s explanation at the time FISA was enacted nor Pfander and Birk’s article
helps to provide an Article III justification for the role of the FISC under the far
different and more expansive judicial review scheme contemplated by the USA
PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act. See infra Part III.B (discussing the
role of FISC under these later statutes).
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2012).
28. Id. § 1810.
29. 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir.
1983).
30. See id. at 1196–98 (rejecting arguments that the FISA court is
inconsistent with constitutional requirements with regard to the judicial branch).
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each statutory prerequisite is met by the application before he
may enter a surveillance order. The FISC judge who is faced
with a surveillance application is not faced with an abstract
issue of law or called upon to issue an advisory opinion, but is,
instead, called upon to ensure that the individuals who are
targeted do not have their privacy interests invaded, except in
compliance with the detailed requirements of the statute. 31

In other words, because of the analogy to ordinary warrants and
the concrete nature of the question that the FISC’s judges were
asked to resolve in approving a government application, the FISC
raised no unique Article III concerns.
Although Megahey was a district court decision, its analysis
was widely adopted by every other court to consider an Article III
challenge to the FISC, including in an influential 1987 Ninth
Circuit opinion by then-Judge Anthony Kennedy.32 Thus, by the
time the FISCR heard the government’s first-ever appeal of a
denial of an application by the FISC in 2002, a three-judge panel
that included Judge Silberman—who had testified against FISA in
1978 at least in part because of Article III concerns—concluded
that “we do not think there is much left to an argument . . . that
the statutory responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent
with Article III case and controversy responsibilities of federal
judges because of the secret, non-adversary process.”33
II. Modern FISA and Article III
By the time the FISCR gave the back of its hand to the Article
III objections to the role of the FISC in 2002, it should have known
better, because two separate sets of flaws in the warrant analogy—
and, thus, in the constitutional defense of the FISC—had begun to
emerge. First, it had proven increasingly difficult for warrants
approved by the FISC to be meaningfully reviewed in subsequent
judicial proceedings. Second, and more fundamentally, the FISC
31. Id. at 1197. Judge Sifton also rejected the defendant’s constitutional
objections to the specialized nature of the court, or the manner in which the judges
were selected. Id. at 1196–98.
32. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791–92 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Megahey and adopting its reasoning).
33. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil.
Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
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had begun to do far more than merely approve government
applications for foreign intelligence surveillance warrants.
A. The Warrant Analogy as a “Razor-Thin Legal Fiction”
Recall from above that the OLC’s constitutional defense of the
role of the FISC turned largely on the extent to which FISA
warrants would be ancillary to subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings, in which they could (and presumably would) be
subject to collateral attack.34 To that end, FISA itself required the
government to disclose to a criminal defendant “any information
obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that
aggrieved person” whenever it “intends to enter [such information]
into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States.”35
It then also furnished the defendant with an opportunity to seek
to suppress the introduction of such information,36 and, in
addition, created a civil cause of action for damages presumably
for cases in which such criminal remedies were inadequate or
ineffective.37
In practice, however, these mechanisms have gone largely
under-(if not un-)utilized. For example, the government reportedly
failed to satisfy its notice obligations under FISA for a substantial
period of time, culminating in a rare public concession by Solicitor
General Verrilli in October 2013 that a number of defendants had
not received the notice required by FISA—and had therefore been
unable to vindicate their right to collaterally attack the underlying
FISA warrant.38
But even when defendants did receive the notice mandated by
the statute (and, quite possibly, the Constitution), courts have
34. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text (discussing FISA warrant
requirements and judicial review).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (2012).
36. Id. § 1806(f).
37. Id. § 1810.
38. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret
Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A3 (discussing how the provision of notice
to criminal defendants opened the door to new legal challenges to certain
government surveillance programs).
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refused to require the government to disclose the materials
submitted in support of the underlying FISA application—holding,
time and again, that such disclosure is not necessary to resolve the
validity of the warrant or of the surveillance conducted pursuant
thereto.39 Although it is impossible to assess the correctness of
these rulings based solely on the public record, at least one circuit
judge has suggested that the statutory process for resolving such
“Franks”40 challenges in FISA cases is deeply flawed—and is,
indeed, effectively unavailable to criminal defendants regardless
of the merits of their claims.41
Finally, even though FISA is the rare example of a statute
creating an express civil cause of action for damages in the
national security sphere,42 the rare plaintiffs who can actually
prove that they were subjected to secret surveillance under FISA
(and who therefore have standing to even invoke FISA’s cause of
action)43 have run into federal court decisions holding, rather
counterintuitively, that FISA is not an express waiver of the
United States government’s “sovereign immunity,” so damages are
not available against the government itself.44

39. United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 486 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1456 (2015).
40. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
a defendant has a right to challenge a search or arrest warrant on the ground that
it was procured by a knowing or reckless falsehood by the officer who applied for
the warrant—and that district courts are entitled to conduct adversarial hearings
to resolve such claims. See id. at 169–72 (discussing probable cause requirements
and district court hearings).
41. See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 485–96 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“As a practical
matter, the secrecy shrouding the FISA process renders it impossible for a
defendant to meaningfully obtain relief under Franks . . . .”); see also Steve
Vladeck, Judge Posner v. Judge Rovner: On Daoud, FISA, and Franks, LAWFARE
(June 17, 2014, 7:56 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/judge-posner-vjudge-rovner-on-daoud-fisa-and-franks/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2015) (comparing the
majority and concurring opinions in the Daoud case) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
42. See 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012) (creating a civil cause of action).
43. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (finding
a lack of standing and reasoning that a present injury is not established where a
party could show no more than a risk of surveillance).
44. See al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845, 855 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that Congress “deliberately did not waive immunity with
respect to § 1810”).
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The net effect of these three interrelated phenomena has been
to call into serious question just how meaningful an opportunity
FISA provides to those whose communications are intercepted
pursuant to a FISA warrant to collaterally attack that warrant.
And insofar as the existence of such collateral proceedings is a
necessary element of any Article III defense of the role of the FISC,
their practical unavailability may well call that defense into
serious question. As Professor Robert Chesney suggested in 2013
congressional testimony, the possibility that a FISA warrant today
will meaningfully be litigated in subsequent judicial proceedings is
a “razor-thin legal fiction.”45
B. Moving Away from the Warrant Analogy
And yet, as significant as these developments have been in
calling into question the strength of the warrant analogy, shifts in
the substantive authorities that the FISC is tasked with
overseeing—and the review the FISC provides—have all but
eviscerated even the “razor-thin legal fiction” that the warrant
analogy still provides for “classic” FISA applications.
For example, Congress in 1998 for the first time authorized
the FISC to approve more than just an individual warrant, giving
its judges the power under new “Title V” of the Act to issue “an
order authorizing a common carrier, public accommodation
facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility to release
records in its possession for an investigation to gather foreign
intelligence information or an [FBI] investigation concerning
international terrorism . . . .”46 Whereas classic FISA “warrants”
required a determination of probable cause to believe that the
target was (or was an agent of) a foreign power, this new provision
only required a determination that “there are specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom
45. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for
Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165,
1224 n.187 (2013) (quoting Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S.
Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 31 (2013) (written statement of Robert Chesney,
Professor, Univ. of Tex. Law Sch.)).
46. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411 (prior version codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012)).
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the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.”47 Thus, the 1998 amendment still required a nexus to an
identified suspect, but the role of the FISC had shifted—
fundamentally—from approving something akin to a search
warrant to signing off on something that looked much more like a
subpoena directed to a (narrow) class of innocent third parties.
After the September 11 attacks, Congress dramatically
expanded the business records provision through § 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.48 In particular, § 215 rewrote Title V to
empower the FISC to require “the production of any tangible
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.”49 Unlike the 1998 language, § 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act was not limited to a small class of businesses, nor
did it require any showing of a connection between the “tangible
things” being sought and “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.”50
Instead, all the government had to show—and all the FISC
was allowed to require—was that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an
authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)
conducted . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”51
Thus, whereas the 1998 addition of Title V could have been
defended as a shift in the degree of the FISC’s review, § 215
represented a shift in kind—away from any individualized inquiry
about suspected agents of a foreign power and toward far broader,
“bulk” collection against putatively unidentified individuals.
Perhaps because of the fundamental shift in the role of the
FISC that § 215 portended, the USA PATRIOT Act also for the first
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)).
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
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time authorized adversarial participation before the FISC. Thus,
anyone receiving a “production order” under § 215 was given the
right to challenge the order before the FISC on the ground that it
“does not meet the requirements of [section 215] or is otherwise
unlawful.”52 And if such a challenge was unsuccessful, the
recipient was further empowered to file a petition for review of the
FISC’s decision with the FISCR—and, if they were unsuccessful
there, a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court.53 Tellingly, though, as of July, 2013, no recipient of a
production order under § 215 had ever availed themselves of the
adversarial review Congress had provided.54
Although Congress amended FISA a number of times in the
ensuing years,55 the next major shift in the role of the FISC came
via the temporary Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA),56 which was
quickly followed by the more permanent FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (FAA).57 Whereas section 215 was directed toward
surveillance conducted within the United States, both the PAA and
FAA were principally concerned with the collection of information
involving non-U.S. persons, but that transited through servers,
internet switches, or other infrastructure located within the
United States.58 To that end, Congress authorized the government
to obtain “directives” from the FISC—annual authorizations for
the programmatic collection of communications that, so long as
they were not targeted at U.S. persons, would be reviewed by the
FISC solely for adherence to a series of (detailed) procedural

52. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(B).
53. Id. § 1861(f)(3).
54. See Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Hon.
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 8–9 (July 29, 2013)
(“To date, no recipient of a production order has opted to invoke [the judicial
review provisions] of the statute.”).
55. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50
U.S.C. (2012)).
56. Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007) (formerly codified in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C.).
57. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
58. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 1, at 25–27 (discussing the background
and content of the FISA Amendments Act).
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requirements.59 Thus, and unlike § 215, new § 702 of FISA
appeared to enlist the FISC in ex ante approval of programmatic
surveillance—as opposed to applying legal principles to specific
facts.
As in § 215, Congress again provided for adversarial review,
authorizing an “electronic communication service provider” that
received such a “directive” to seek to modify or set aside the
directive on the ground that “the directive does not meet the
requirements of [the FAA], or is otherwise unlawful.”60 The 2007
and 2008 Acts also provided far more detail about what such
judicial review should look like, including procedures for initial
(and, if warranted, “plenary”) review,61 and express authorization
to hold non-compliant parties in contempt.62 As with § 215, the
party that lost in the FISC was given an express right to appeal to
the FISCR and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court.63
Unlike § 215, these procedures have been taken advantage of
at least once—culminating in a 2008 FISCR decision in a case we
now know to have been brought by the technology company Yahoo!,
in which the FISCR upheld the Protect America Act against a
Fourth Amendment (but, tellingly, not an Article III64) challenge.65
And yet, as of July, 2013, Yahoo!’s case was the only publicly
acknowledged instance in which an electronic communication
service provider had pursued the adversarial process provided by

59. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). This provision is commonly referred to as
“section 702” because it is § 702 of FISA itself—as amended over time.
60. Id. § 1881a(h)(4)(C).
61. Id. §§ 1881a(h)(4)(D)–(E).
62. Id. § 1881a(h)(4)(G).
63. See id. § 1881a(h)(6) (providing for appellate review).
64. Although Yahoo! did not appear to raise Article III objections in the
litigation before the FISC or FISCR, the plaintiffs in Clapper v. Amnesty
International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), did challenge the FISA Amendments Act at
least in part on Article III (in addition to First and Fourth Amendment) grounds.
Because that suit went to the Supreme Court on (and was ultimately thrown out
for lack of) standing, no court ever considered the plaintiffs’ (serious) Article III
objections.
65. See In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009–13 (U.S. Foreign Intell.
Surveil. Ct. Rev. 2008) (“[A]ssessing the intrusions at issue in light of the
governmental interest at stake and the panoply of protections that are in place,
we discern no principled basis for invalidating the PAA as applied here.”).
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either the 2007 or 2008 Acts.66 Whether because the FISCR’s
decision in the Yahoo! case foreordained the merits of any such
challenge, the providers had no interest in biting the hand that fed
them, or any number of other reasons, the adversarial process
Congress provided in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Protect America
Act, and the FISA Amendments Act has proven more theoretical
than real.
C. The Contemporary FISC and Article III
Given the virtually empty set of adversarial cases before the
FISC, along with the concern that the recipients of production
orders under the USA PATRIOT Act or directives under the FISA
Amendments Act may not share the interests of their customers,
one of the more common themes of calls for post-Snowden reforms
to United States surveillance law and policy has been to provide
for more adversarial participation before the FISC. Although these
proposals have taken a number of forms, their core idea involves
the creation of a “special advocate,” whose job is to appear opposite
of the government in at least some cases before the FISC and to
argue on behalf of the public, those whose communications are
being targeted by the government application at issue, or some
combination of the two.67
Curiously, one of the objections that has been raised to such
proposals is that such participation by a nominal adversary would
not satisfy Article III.68 But as I have explained before,
if the government’s application suffices to create an Article III
case or controversy, that case or controversy necessarily
persists for the duration of the authorities that the FISA Court’s
granting of the application provides. That’s why . . . there is no
Article III problem with having a “special advocate” participate
in the FISA Court itself, even after the initial application has
been approved.69

66. Walton Letter, supra note 54, at 8–9.
67. See Special Advocate, supra note 3, at 18–23 (arguing that the addition
of a special advocate is a necessary reform measure).
68. See, e.g., NOLAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–35 (pointing out theoretical
Article III standing concerns raised by the addition of a public advocate).
69. Steve Vladeck, Article III, Appellate Review, and the Leahy Bill: A
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In other words, although there may be Article III problems with
the FISC, it is difficult (if not impossible) to see how those problems
are exacerbated (rather than ameliorated) by more consistent
adversarial participation. The harder question is just how serious
these Article III concerns truly are. In that respect, it will be
helpful, once again, to differentiate between “classic” FISA and the
newer authorities, especially those provided by the USA PATRIOT
Act and the FISA Amendments Act.
In the context of “classic” FISA, there are two different
grounds on which the FISC’s fealty to Article III could be defended:
First, razor-thin though the fiction may be, the analogy to
warrants still holds, at least in theory.70 Thus, FISA warrants are
generally still subject to collateral attack, whether through
Franks-like motions to suppress in criminal cases, or through civil
suits under FISA’s own cause of action.71 That these efforts rarely
succeed does not of itself prove their unavailability.72 After all,
even in the context of “ordinary” warrants, collateral attacks are,
in practice, only realistically available in a small minority of
cases.73
Second, if one accepts the theory of “non-contentious
jurisdiction” offered by James Pfander and Daniel Birk, “classic”
FISA would satisfy Article III whether or not warrants issued by
the FISC were in fact ancillary to subsequent judicial
proceedings.74 As they explain, “the FISC’s role in hearing warrant
applications on an ex parte basis seems to fit comfortably within
the scope of federal judicial power over matters of non-contentious
Response to Orin Kerr, LAWFARE (July 31, 2014, 10:54 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/article-iii-appellate-review-and-the-leahy-bill-aresponse-to-orin-kerr/ (last visited July 11, 2015) (discussing a FISA Court
proceeding) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See supra Part II (analyzing the continuing vitality of the warrant
analogy).
71. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing remedies
created for aggrieved parties).
72. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring)
(noting that a constitutional issue might arise if an avenue of judicial review
available in theory turns out to be unavailable in practice).
73. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (explaining the hurdles
potential plaintiffs face when seeking relief).
74. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the
“non-contentious jurisdiction” theory).
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jurisdiction.”75 Thus, one could defend the work of the FISC in
approving FISA warrants against an Article III challenge solely by
reference to Pfander and Birk’s approach without regard to the
remedies actually available in subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings. Taken together, then, it seems likely that, insofar as
FISA satisfied Article III at its inception, the FISC is continuing
to satisfy Article III today at least when called upon to issue
individualized FISA warrants.76
As should be clear by now, the far closer question is whether
the FISC is also acting consistently with Article III when it issues
production orders under § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, or when
it issues directives under § 702 of FISA as provided in the FISA
Amendments Act. To reiterate, such proceedings raise two
separate Article III concerns: First, unless the recipient of the
production order or directive chooses to object, there is no adverse
party before the FISC—and, unlike in the context of classic FISA,
no meaningful analogy to ordinary warrants with regard to the
availability of collateral attacks in subsequent judicial proceedings
or with regard to Pfander and Birk’s theory of “non-contentious
jurisdiction.”77 Second, insofar as the FISC is asked in these cases
to do something other than apply established law to case-specific
facts, there is also a concern that there is no “case or controversy”
for the court to decide, more generally.78
Ultimately, it is impossible to predict whether the Supreme
Court might eventually find either of these Article III objections
convincing. On the one hand, both the USA PATRIOT Act and the
FISA Amendments Act do contemplate adversarial participation,
even if they do not mandate it in every case.79 And although the
FISA Amendments Act, especially, seems to enlist the FISC in
approving relatively abstract authorizations, federal courts often
play a largely similar role in the context of reviewing other
75. Pfander & Birk, supra note 26, at 1464.
76. See supra notes 52–68 (discussing the changes in warrant procedures
since FISC’s inception).
77. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the adverseness
requirement and its relation to FISC).
78. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the Article III case
or controversy requirement as applied to FISC).
79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the adverseness
requirement and its relation to FISC).
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administrative action—the abstract nature of which has not
generally been fatal to the courts’ power to entertain facial (as
opposed to “as applied”) challenges thereto.
On the other hand, the warrant analogy was weak enough to
begin with and there have been vanishingly few examples of
adversarial participation under the procedures Congress created
in the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act. Thus,
one could certainly sympathize with arguments such as those
made in a recent Brennan Center report—that the FISC probably
is acting in violation of Article III when it approves directives
under the FISA Amendments Act and perhaps when it approves
production orders under § 215, as well.80 And unlike in the context
of classic FISA warrants, neither of these authorities would seem
to be examples of the kind of “non-contentious jurisdiction” for
which Pfander and Birk have suggested no meaningful ancillary
proceedings are constitutionally necessary.
Whether or not they are meritorious, the Article III concerns
raised by how the FISC handles government applications under
both the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act should
at the very least be strong enough so as to encourage Congress, as
it did when it enacted FISA originally, to take steps to mitigate the
potential unconstitutionality. Mandating adversarial participation
by a “special advocate,” at least in cases arising under the USA
PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act, could only be a
salutary measure in that respect.81 Indeed, although the
participation of a meaningful adversary would not vitiate the
case-or-controversy objections to § 702, it would certainly convert
judicial review of directives under the FISA Amendments Act to
something that far more closely resembles ordinary administrative
law processes, for which the Article III precedents are far better
established.
At that point, to be sure, one might well wonder why a
super-secret court designed to act ex parte and in camera should
also be in charge of reviewing such fundamentally different

80. See supra notes 1–2 (discussing critiques regarding the constitutionality
of FISC).
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (arguing that the addition of a
special advocate is an important reform measure).
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surveillance authorities. But that debate would largely take place
on terms of prudential wisdom, at least, and not constitutionality.

